ABSTRACT. We consider a differentiated product duopoly where a regulated firm competes with a private firm. The instrument of regulation is the level of privatization. First, the regulator determines the level of privatization to maximize social welfare. Then both firms endogenously choose the mode of competition (that is, whether to compete in price or quantity). Finally, the two firms compete in the market. Under a very general demand specification, we show that when the products are imperfect substitutes (complements), there is co-existence of private and public (strictly partially privatized) firms. Moreover, in the second stage, the firms compete in prices.
INTRODUCTION
What happens if, instead of two profit maximizing firms, we consider a regulated firm and a profit maximizing firm in the duoploy market with differentiated product? Singh and Vives [30] and Cheng [5] considered a two-stage game for a differentiated product duopoly market where both firms are profit maximizers. In the first stage, the firms credibly announce to play in either quantity or price strategies. If the goods are substitutes (complements), then it is shown that quantity or Cournot (price or Bertrand) competition is the SPNE outcome of this two stage game (see Singh and Vives [30] and Cheng [5] ). In this paper we model the co-existence of a regulated firm and a profit maximizing firm and, in particular, we model the objective of the regulator and then (like Singh and Vives [30] ) allow the firms to decide on the mode of competition before competing in the market. In a static scenario this calls for a three stage game which to the best of our knowledge has not been done in the differentiated product literature. 1 Moreover, there are many papers that provide important results by assuming quadratic utility function or CES utility function of the representative consumer. We want to come out of this limitation as well and allow for more general demand specifications to provide our results with the three stage game. The primary reason for this three-stage game stems from the fact that when the goods are imperfect substitutes, it is not always the case that we find profit maximizing firms operating in a Date: October 3, 2017. 1 All the models in the existing literature either endogenize the mode of competition or endogenize the objective of the non-profit maximizing firm but not both. Hence, we only have two stage (and not three-stage) models in the existing literature. See the related literature section for details. market and competing in quantities (like the results in Singh and Vives [30] and Cheng [5] suggest). Objective different from profit maximization for imperfect substitutes is a special feature of many markets in many countries. Examples include the telecom sector, banking industry, airlines, postal services, health sector, and education sector (see for example Backx, Carney and Gedajlovic [3] , Badertscher, Shroff and White [4] , Doganis [11] and La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer [21] ). Even in developed countries we often find the co-existence of welfare maximizing public firm and profit maximizing private firms. 2 Therefore, one cannot deny the role of regulation in the differentiated products markets. 3 Assuming a market where a private firm competes with a public firm, it was shown by Matsumura and Ogawa [24] that, with quadratic utility function of the representative consumer, price (Bertrand) competition is the SPNE of the two stage game regardless of whether goods are substitutes or complements. Therefore, one cannot unambiguously confirm that quantity competition will always follow in a differentiated product market when at least one firm is not a profit maximizer. However, what guarantees the co-existence of public firm and private firm in a differentiated product market? This requires a more careful modeling of the regulatory instrument and it is also for this reason that our contribution is important.
We first add an earlier (first) stage to the two-stage game of Singh and Vives [30] and Cheng [5] . In the first stage, a (regulator) government decides how much weight the partially privatized firm must attach to its own profit and social welfare assuming that the competing firm is a profit maximizer. We show that in such a set-up, when the goods are substitutes we uniquely end up in the co-existence of welfare maximizing public firm and profit maximizing private firms, that is, no privatization Bertrand equilibrium is the SPNE outcome of this game where the government sets zero (full) weight to profit (social welfare) of the partially privatized firm and both firms compete in prices (that is, Bertrand competition). When the goods are complements we uniquely end up in an SPNE outcome which we call strictly partial privatization Bertrand equilibrium where, in Stage 1, the government adds non-zero weights to both Firm 1's own profit and social welfare and, in Stage 2, firms play price strategies.
The first stage regulatory instrument of the government is the weight θ (lying in the closed interval [0, 1]) attached to the profit of the partially privatized firm and the residual weight (1 − θ) attached to the welfare of the society. According to Vives [33] , when both firms are profit maximizers, then, with Cournot competition, there is less of a profit loss with price under-cutting than with Bertrand competition. However, when we have one partially privatized firm, then there exists a critical value of weight (θ ∈ (0, 1)) such that for each weight below this critical weight, there exists a critical price of Firm 2 below which Vives's [33] argument holds and, more importantly, above this critical price the reverse argument holds, that is, with Bertrand competition there is less of a profit loss with price under-cutting than with Cournot competition. It is precisely this feature that drives our main result when the goods are substitutes.
Our results hold under very general demand specifications. Moreover, our results are true even when the quantity reaction functions transformed in the price space are non-monotonic. In particular, for substitute goods, our result hold under the set of assumptions made by Cheng [5] and with an additional assumption on welfare which is general enough and was used in Ghosh and Mitra [16] . To prove our results we have at times made use of Cheng's [5] geometric approach and, to prove one lemma, we have also used the line integral techniques similar to the one used in Ghosh and Mitra [15] , [16] . Specifically, to find the exact cut-off weight (θ) for the optimal choice of mode of competition for Firm 2 changes we use line integral techniques and then we apply Cheng's [5] geometric approach to sequentially eliminate possibilities other than the price competition.
The paper is organized as follows. We conclude this section with a brief discussion on the related literature. In Section 2, we introduce the basic framework, our assumptions with imperfect substitute goods and we explain the three stage game. In Section 3, we present our main theorem with imperfect substitutes. In Section 4, we present the result with complement goods. In Section 5, we address the robustness of our game with quadratic utility and we also address the issue of cost asymmetry. In Section 6 we provide our conclusions followed by an appendix section (Section 7) where we provide the proofs of all the results.
1.1. Related literature. The classic work by Singh and Vives [30] endogenize price and quantity strategies with profit maximizing firms in a differentiated product market. This was later generalized by Cheng [5] by providing an elegant geometric approach. There are papers that deal with Bertrand Cournot comparison with profit maximizing firm in a differentiated products market with general demand specifications (see for example Cheng [6] , Häckner [18] , Okuguchi [28] and Vives [33] , [34] ).
In this paper we apply two stages of endogenization. The first stage endogenization is the objective function of the partially privatized firm and, like Singh and Vives [30] and Cheng [5] , the second stage endogenization is price and quantity strategies. The first stage endogenization of adding positive weights on welfare in a firm's objective function seems natural in the context of partially privatized firms (see, for example, the papers in the mixed-oligopoly literature by Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse [1] , Ghosh and Mitra [15] , [16] , Matsumura [23] and Matsumura and Ogawa [24] ). This literature focuses on mixed markets where both private and partially privatized (or public) firms coexist. In the early stages of industrialization of developing economies, there is often an upper bound on the extent of private ownership. When a foreign firm tries to enter a domestic market, the government can ask the foreign firm to pursue an objective different from profit maximization that includes Corporate Social Responsibility (for example, taking initiative to assess and take responsibility for the company's effects on the environment and impact on social welfare). If we assume that the government cares about social welfare and private firms' care about profit, then it seems plausible to assume that the partially privatized firm maximize a weighted combination of profit and welfare. Therefore, objectives different from profit is quite important and prevalent in the industrial organization literature. A paper with a very general objective function that allows for altruism and informational asymmetry is by Heifetz, Shannon and Spiegel [20] . However, Heifetz, Shannon and Spiegel [20] do not allow for either privatization based enodogeneity (like Stage 1 of our three stage game) or price-quantity based endogeneity (like Stage 2 of our three stage game). Even when we have fully privatized firms, we know from the managerial-delegation literature that managers maximize a weighted combination of profit and quantity/revenue/welfare and it is compatible with profit maximization (see Fershtman and Judd [13] , Miller and Pazgal [25] , Sklivas [31] and Vickers [32] ).
With quadratic utility function there is a growing literature that studies the coexistence of partially privatized firm and a private firm in a differentiated product market. With quadratic utility, only Stage 1 endogeneity like ours was addressed by Fujiwara [14] and by Ohnishi [26] . In Fujiwara [14] , it is argued that under Cournot competition it is optimal to choose a positive weight θ > 0 for the partially privatized firm. In Ohnishi [26] , it was argued that under Bertrand competition it is optimal to choose zero weight θ = 0 for the partially privatized firm. Our analysis shows that, in general, if we also endogenize mode of competition along with θ, then Cournot competition (Fujiwara's [14] analysis) is never achieved as an equilibrium outcome. With quadratic utility, only Stage 2 endogeneity like ours was addressed by Matsumura and Ogawa [24] with an added assumption that one firm is fully public (that is, θ is exogenously fixed at 0). Matsumura and Ogawa [24] argued that Bertrand competition is the SPNE of the two stage game regardless of whether goods are substitutes or complements. We show that Bertrand competition is the SPNE of the three stage game, which allows for endogenous determination of the level of privatization θ. Moreover, our results hold for a very general demand specification.
De Fraja and Delbono [7] show that, in homogeneous goods Cournot oligopoly with decreasing returns to scale technology, coexistence of a fully public firm with one or more private firms results in lower social welfare compared to that in oligopoly with only private firms. However, full privatization of the public firm is not socially desirable either; instead partial privatization of the public firm is socially optimal (see Matsumura [23] ). These results hold true in the case of differentiated products mixed oligopoly with constant returns to scale technology as well (see Fuziwara [14] ). That is, when firms compete in quantities, it is inefficient to have a fully public firm in the industry and this inefficiency in mixed oligopoly can be mitigated by partially privatizing the public firm. On the other hand, when firms compete in prices, coexistence of a fully public firm with one or more private firms is socially desirable and, thus, privatization (partial or full) of the public firm looses its appeal under price competition (see Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse [1] ; Sanjo [29] ; Ohnishi [26] ), unless goods are complements (see Ohnishi [27] ). This paper shows that, the level of privatization of the public firm has important consequences on the nature of product market competition and when firms can choose the mode of product market competition, coexistence of a fully public firm with one or more private firms is socially optimal, except in case of complementary goods. That is, optimality of partial privatization cannot be sustained when the nature of product market competition is endogenously determined when the goods are imperfect substitute. We further show (in Section 5) that this result can be valid even when the public firm is relatively inefficient (but not "too" inefficient) compared to its private counterparts.
PRELIMINARIES
We consider an economy with a competitive sector producing the numéraire good (money) y and with a imperfectly competitive sector where two firms operate. Each firm produces a differentiated good. For any firm i ∈ {1, 2}, let p i and q i denote Firm i's price and quantity respectively. For convenience we define the following notations. Let + represent the non-negative orthant of the real line . For any x = (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ 2 + and any y = (y 1 , y 2 ) ∈ 2 + , x = y means either x 1 = y 1 or x 2 = y 2 , x ≥ y means x 1 ≥ y 1 and x 2 ≥ y 2 , and, x >> y means x 1 > y 1 and x 2 > y 2 . We assume a representative consumer who maximizes U (q, y) := U(q) + y subject to
and for any i, j ∈ {1, 2} such that
. Similarly, for any firm i ∈ {1, 2} and any firm specific function
Given V(q, y) is quasi-linear, there is no income effect and hence the representative consumer's optimization is to select q to maximize U(q) − p 1 q 1 − p 2 q 2 . Utility maximization yields the inverse demand function p i = U i (q) := F QQ i (q) for all q ≥ (0, 0) and for each i ∈ {1, 2}. Using Assumption 1 it follows that
From Assumption 1(iv) we know that the demand system is invertible. Therefore, given any price vector p = (p 1 , p 2 ) >> (0, 0), we get the direct demand function q i = F PP i (p) for each i ∈ {1, 2}. Let |D| := U 11 (q)U 22 (q) − (U 12 (q)) 2 > 0. Given Assumption 1, it also follows that F PP i,i (p) = U jj (q)/|D| < 0 and F PP i,j (p) = −U ij (q)/|D| > 0 for i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i = j. For any i ∈ {1, 2}, any quantity q i ≥ 0, the level set Q i (q i ) = {p | p >> (0, 0), F QQ i (p) = q i } generates iso-quantity curve for Firm i in the price space. Due to Assumption 1, the slope of the iso-quantity curve at q i = q i is dp j dp i
By Assumption 1, own effect dominates cross effect implying that Q 1 is steeper than Q 2 in the price space (see Cheng [5] ). We assume symmetric total cost of both the firms and it is given by C(y) = cy where c > 0 and y ≥ 0. When both firms choose quantity as a strategic variable, profit of Firm i is given as π 
Assumption 1, Assumption 2 and Assumption 3 are very standard and these are satisfied by any standard demand function when products are imperfect substitutes (see Cheng [5] and Vives [34] ). Let CS = U − p 1 q 1 − p 2 q 2 denote the consumer surplus and π = π 1 + π 2 = (p 1 − c)q 1 + (p 2 − c)q 2 denote the aggregate profit with π 1 (π 2 ) representing profit of Firm 1 (Firm 2). The (social) welfare is given by W = CS + π = U − c(q 1 + q 2 ). The welfare function when both firms choose quantity as a strategic variable is given by
The welfare function when both firms choose price as a strategic variable is given by
An assumption similar to Assumption 4 was used in Ghosh and Mitra [16] . Assumption 4 (i) is necessary to satisfy the second order condition of any welfare maximizing firm. We consider two very standard utility specifications. Suppose that the utility function of the representative consumer is given by
where a (> c) is a preference parameter, γ (−1 < γ < 1) is the product differentiation parameter (see Dixit [8] and Singh and Vives [30] ). A positive (negative) value of γ indicates substitute (complement) goods. We first restrict attention to substitute goods case. One can show that the quadratic utility function given in (1) satisfies all our assumptions (that is, Assumption 1 to Assumption 4) when the goods are substitutes. Suppose that the utility function of the representative consumer is given by
where σ = 1 1−s measure the elasticity of substitution (see Dixit and Stiglitz [10] and Vives [34] ). Goods are substitute if γ, s ∈ [0, 1] and complement if γ, s ∈ [−∞, 0]. We first restrict attention to substitute goods case. One can show that the CES utility function satisfies the first three assumptions (that is, Assumption 1 to Assumption 3). If 1 − 2s + γs 2 > 0, then Assumption 4 is satisfied by the CES utility functions given in (2).
Remark 1.
It is important to note that we consider a weaker set assumptions than what is required for the stability of the equilibrium according to Dixit [9] .
2.1. The three stage game. We assume that Firm 1 is partially privatized (maximizing a weighted sum of welfare and its own profit) and Firm 2 is a private firm (maximizing its own profit). Therefore, the payoff function of Firm 1 is V 1 := θπ 1 + (1 − θ)W (where θ is the privatization ratio) and that of Firm 2 is π 2 . Specifically, if Firm 1 is a public (private) firm, then θ = 0 (θ = 1) and Firm 1 maximizes social welfare (its own profit). For any given weight θ ∈ (0, 1), Firm 1 maximizes the weighted sum of its own profit and social welfare. We consider a three stage game Γ and the stages of the game are as follows.
• Stage1: The government decides the level of privatization (θ ∈ [0, 1]) in order to maximize social welfare.
• Stage 2: Each firm decides (simultaneously and independently) whether to adopt a price strategy (call it P) or a quantity strategy (call it Q). See Table 1 . We solve the game using backward induction. Given the first stage choice of θ, let the optimal price and quantity of Firm i be p XY i (θ) and q XY i (θ) assuming Firm 1 adopts strategy X and Firm 2 adopts strategy Y where X, Y ∈ {P, Q}. We denote the consequent profit of Firm i at the optimal choice and contingent on XY by π
. Similarly, the consequent welfare at this optimal choice and contingent on XY is W XY (θ) = We define four possible types of equilibria of Γ.
) be a Bertrand equilibrium with equilibrium weight θ PP . If θ PP = 0, then we call it the no privatization Bertrand equilibrium. If θ PP ∈ (0, 1), then we call it the strictly partial privatization Bertrand equilibrium. 
, that is, no privatization Bertrand equilibrium, is the unique SPNE outcome of Γ.
Before going to the proof of Theorem 1 we illustrate the relevant reaction functions that will be helpful for our analysis. If both firms compete in prices, then for any 
. By Assumption 3, we know that R PP 2 is a positively sloped curve with slope less than unity (see Cheng [5] ) hence it is invertible. Therefore, we can represent it as p 2 = R PP 2 (p 1 ). In Figure 1 , we represent curve is negatively sloped and its slope is more than unity in absolute sense. Therefore, we can represent it as
The reaction function of Firm 2 is locus of all points in the set R
(in the (q 1 , q 2 ) plane) is strictly decreasing with slope less than unity in absolute sense (see Cheng [5] ) and hence is invertible. Therefore, we can represent it as
and their respective equations in implicate form are Figure 1 , the set of points in P (SV QQ 1 (0)) is represented by the line p 1 = c. Like Cheng [5] , one can show that the set of points P (R QQ 2 ) must lie above the R PP 2 R PP 2 . One such representation is the r 2 r 2 curve in Figure 1 . 
Lemma 1 states that with price competition and given any θ ∈ (0, 1), at any equilibrium price
it is always optimal for Firm 1 to increase (decrease) price given Firm 2's price remains at p PP 2 (θ) when Firm 1 is a profit (welfare) maximizer.
Lemma 2.
For any θ ∈ (0, 1),
(ii)
> 0, and, for any i = 1, 2,
Lemma 2 provides the standard comparative static results.
Lemma 3.
(i) There exists a unique
Assume that Firm 1 chooses price strategy. Lemma 3 (i) states that there exist a unique θ 1 ∈ (0, 1) for which Firm 2 is indifferent between choosing price strategy and quantity strategy. Moreover, if θ < θ 1 , then price strategy is optimal for Firm 2, and, if θ > θ 1 , then quantity strategy is optimal for Firm 2. Next, assume that Firm 2 chooses price strategy. Lemma 3 (ii) states that there exist θ 3 ∈ (0, 1) for which Firm 1 is indifferent between choosing price or quantity strategy. Moreover, if θ < θ 3 , then Firm 1 chooses price strategy. Lemma 3 (iii) states that when Firm 1 chooses quantity strategy, there exist an unique θ 4 ∈ (0, 1) for which Firm 2 is indifferent between choosing price strategy and quantity strategy. For any θ < θ 4 , price strategy is optimal and, for any θ > θ 4 , quantity strategy is optimal. The cut-off point θ 1 (θ 4 ) is associated with the case where Firm 1 chooses price (quantity) strategy. These cut-off points in Lemma 3 (i) and (iii) reflects the reversal in the cost of adopting price strategy for Firm 2 compared to quantity strategy. For the privatization weights below these cut-off points the reverse intuition of Vives [33] holds. To prove Lemma 3 (i) and Lemma 3 (iii) we use the line integral technique which is the two-variable asymmetric version of the one used in Ghosh and Mitra [15] , [16] . Moreover, at θ = 0, the government can uniquely induce price strategy for both firms.
Lemma 4 indicates that no privatization Bertrand equilibrium is a possible SPNE outcome of Γ. Specifically, if we can rule out the other modes of competition (that is, if we can rule out both firms choosing quantity strategy and if we can rule out one firm choosing price strategy and the other firm choosing quantity strategy), then from Lemma 4 it will follow that the no privatization Bertrand equilibrium is the unique SPNE outcome of Γ. The remaining lemmas together rule out other modes of competition and completes the proof of Theorem 1. Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 that follows rule out the possibilities of Type 1 and Type 2 equilibria.
Lemma 5. There is no
Finally, to rule out the possibility of quantity competition, let us first generate the Cournot equilibrium path in the (p 1 , p 2 ) space by varying θ from 0 to 1 and plotting the corresponding price vector. See the path B A in Figure 1 where B corresponds to (p
The next lemma captures the exact behavior of the Cournot equilibrium path as we vary θ.
in terms of arch length of the path, then θ > θ .
Lemma 7 can be explained in terms of the B A segment of the r 2 r 2 in Figure 1 . For each point in the segment B A , we can associate a (p QQ 1 (θ), p QQ 2 (θ)) vector. Lemma 7 states that as we move along the B A segment of the r 2 r 2 curve (starting from B and ending at A ), the underlying θ increases. Finally, to complete the proof of Theorem 1, we need to eliminate the possibility of quantity competition. Given Lemma 7 identifies the properties of the Cournot equilibrium path in terms of θ, we can use this path along with the cut-off point θ 4 (identified in Lemma 3 (iii)) to establish the impossibility of quantity competition. Hence, we have Lemma 8.
COMPLEMENTS
To obtain the equilibrium outcome when the goods are complement we use the following assumptions.
Assumption 5. For
Assumption 5, Assumption 6 and Assumption 7 are very standard and these are satisfied by any standard demand function when the goods are complements (see Singh and Vives [30] and Vives [34] ). Assumption 8 (i) is necessary to satisfy the second order condition of any welfare maximizing firm. With the quadratic (CES) utility function given by condition (1) (condition (2)), Assumption 5, Assumption 6, Assumption 7 and Assumption 8 are satisfied.
Before going to our result we explain the implications of Assumption 5, Assumption 6, Assumption 7 and Assumption 8 in terms of reactions functions in the price plane using Figure 2 . In particular, we are interested in the function p 2 = R PP 2 (p 1 ), the set P (R QQ 2 ) for Firm 2 and, for θ ∈ {0, 1}, we are interested in the function p 1 = SV PP 1 (p 2 , θ) and the set P (SV QQ 1 (θ)) for Firm 1. In Figure 2 , the curve R 2 R 2 represents the reaction function of Firm 2 when Firm 1 chooses price strategy, that is, p 2 = R PP 2 (p 1 ). By Assumption 7, it is decreasing in p 1 with an absolute slope less than unity. Given Assumption 7 (ii), π PP 2,22 (p) < 0 implying that in the region above the R 2 R 2 curve π PP 2,2 (p) < 0 and in the region below the R 2 R 2 curve we have π PP 2,2 (p) < 0. Therefore, given π PP 2,1 (p) = (p 2 − c)F PP 2,1 (p) < 0, in the region above the R 2 R 2 curve, the iso-profit curve of Firm 2 is decreasing and in the region below the R 2 R 2 curve, the iso-profit curve of Firm 2 is increasing. In each point in the set P (R QQ 2 ), Firm 2 maximizes profit π PP 2 (p) subject to q 1 = F PP 1 (p). Hence, each point in the set P (R QQ 2 ) is a point of tangency between the iso-profit curve of Firm 2 and the iso-quantity curve of Firm 1. By Assumption 5, the iso-quantity curve of Firm 1 is negatively sloped implying that the tangency of the iso-quantity curve of Firm 1 with the iso-profit curve of Firm 2 must lie above the R 2 R 2 curve. Therefore the set of points in P (R QQ 2 ) lie above the R 2 R 2 curve. Finally, as we move along the R 2 R 2 curve towards the p 2 axis, the profit of the Firm 2 increases since Figure 2 , the R 1 R 1 curve is the reaction function of Firm 1, that is, p 1 = SV PP 1 (p 2 , 1) for θ = 1. By Assumption 7, it is decreasing and the slope is greater than unity. One can also show that each point in the set P (SV QQ 1 (1)) lies to the right of the R 1 R 1 curve. By definition, p 1 = c represents the set of points in the set P (SV QQ 1 (0)). In Figure 2 , the S 1 S 1 curve represents the function p 1 = SV PP 1 (p 2 , 0) and it satisfies the following condition.
| and hence using (3) it follows that the S 1 S 1 curve must lie between the p 1 = c line and the p 1 + p 2 = 2c line (see line PP in Figure 2 ). Similarly, the S 2 S 2 curve represents the locus of points satisfying W PP 2 (p) = 0 and this curve lies between the p 2 = c and the PP lines. In Figure 2 , point B is the intersection point between the R 1 R 1 curve and the R 2 R 2 curve representing the Bertrand equilibrium point for θ = 1. Since both firm are facing symmetric demand and identical cost conditions, point B lies on the p 1 = p 2 line. Point A is the point of intersection between the S 1 S 1 curve and the R 2 R 2 curve representing the Bertrand equilibrium for θ = 0. Given any θ ∈ [0, 1], the function p 1 = SV PP 1 (p 2 , θ) lies between the S 1 S 1 curve and the R 1 R 1 curve. Therefore, for any θ, the equilibrium price vector (p PP 1 (θ), p PP 2 (θ)) must belong to the segment AB of the R 2 R 2 curve. Proposition 1. Suppose Assumption 5, Assumption 6, Assumption 7 and Assumption 8 hold.
There exists θ PP ∈ (0, 1) such that the strictly partial privatization Bertrand equilibrium strategy combination (θ PP , (P, 
In case of complements, for any γ ∈ (−1, 0), we have the strictly partial privatization Bertrand equilibrium as the unique SPNE outcome of Γ with
Therefore, with differentiated duopoly products, price competition is an inescapable equilibrium outcome when a regulated partially privatized firm competes with a private firm provided the cost difference between the two firms is not too much.
(e) Finally, if we have one regulated firm and more than one profit maximizing firms competing in a differentiated product market, then, by taking a general form of the quadratic utility function given by (1), we can show that in this three stage game it is optimal to select zero weight on profit of the regulated firm under price competition. However, in this scenario it was established by Haraguchi and Matsumura [19] that one cannot always induce price competition. Specifically, Haraguchi and Matsumura [19] show that for any given number of private firms greater than one, we always have a cut-off value of the substitution parameter γ below which one can induce price competition but above which one cannot.
Thus, even in an oligopoly framework, co-existence of a fully public firm and many profit maximizing firms is a possible equilibrium outcome under symmetric cost conditions and with sufficiently low values of the substitution parameter γ.
6. CONCLUSION 6.1. Government ownership as a policy instrument. Efficiency of a market crucially depends on the nature of strategic interaction among firms in the market. For example, unless firms are capacity constrained, price competition among firms results in higher social welfare than competition in terms of quantity. However, it is often difficult for a social planner to find appropriate policy instrument to influence the nature of firms strategic interaction. Analysis of this paper reveals that, when firms are free to choose the strategic variableprice contract vis-á-vis quantity contract, the equilibrium modes of competition depends on the level of privatization of the public firm.
It implies that the level of government ownership of one of the firms operating in a market is an effective policy instrument to influence the nature of strategic interaction among firms in that market in favor of the social planner.
6.2. Implementation aspect of the policy instrument. One can question the implementability aspect of regulating weight on profit of a partially privatized firm. The difficulty of implementability is a valid criticism if, as a policy, one has to sustain a weight on profit of the partially privatized firm which is neither zero nor one (like our SPNE outcome with complements). Specifically if, as a policy, the regulator has to maintain an exact weight θ ∈ (0, 1) on profit of the partially private firm, then it is difficult to implement it if the existing weight on profit of the partially private firm is θ = θ since the transition to θ calls for redistribution of private and public shares of the firm which may be difficult and costly. Moreover, there may be other legal difficulties in the form of upper bounds on private shares. However, by completely disallowing private stakeholders (that is, by retaining only government shares as a rule) in a partially privatized firm, the regulator can transform a partially privatized firm to a public firm. In that sense our result on imperfect substitute that prescribes the co-existence of a purely private firm and a purely public firm is easy to implement relative to our result on complement goods. However, the need for regulation to change the mode of competition is absent when the goods are complement.
6.3. Regulating both firms. If the government regulates both the firms in an otherwise three stage game like ours, then (due to marginal cost pricing) equilibrium social welfare is higher than that of our SPNE outcomes. Moreover, in that case, the mode of competition is also irrelevant. However, in reality we rarely see more than one regulated firm in a differentiated product duopoly (oligopoly) market. In that sense our approach to regulate only one firm is more realistic.
6.4. On the adverse effect of transforming the objective of a public firm towards more profit orientation. A public firm may choose to go private either for significant financial gain of the shareholders and CEOs' and/or to reduced regulatory requirements in order to focus on longterm goals. However, in developed countries (like the USA and the UK), the harmful effects of transition of a public firm towards private firm on the stakeholders was pointed out by Greenfield (see Greenfield [17] ). 4 It is also argued that a public firm going private may induce more overall efficiency in the long-run. Specifically, the English government has radically restructured its school system under an assumption that school autonomy delivers benefits to schools and students. However, the paper by Eyles, Machin and McNally [12] shows that there is no evidence of improvement either in pupil performance or in teaching quality resulting from this conversion.
The harmful short-run effects of more profit orientation in a differentiated product oligopoly market was pointed out by Anderson, de Palma and Thisse [1] (when only quantity competition is admissible and with CES utility function of the representative consumer). Our paper adds to this harmful effects argument of more profit orientation from the social welfare angle for the differentiated product market under symmetric cost conditions. From a policy perspective, our result suggests that if for some reason (other than welfare maximization) the regulator wants to change the orientation of the public firm (in a market with imperfect substitutes) towards more profit (by allocating non-zero weight on profit of the partially private firm), then we can have two types of welfare losses. Not only there is a certain welfare loss due to the increase in profit orientation of the partially private firm, there is a further chance of welfare loss due to a shift in the mode of competition from price to something else. 5 Since our results hold under very general demand specifications, when the goods are substitutes, the policy prescription is to try not to make a public firm more profit oriented.
APPENDIX

Proof of Lemma 1:
We use two steps to prove the result.
Step 
The first order conditions are the following:
Using Assumption 3 (ii) and Assumption 4 (i) it follows that V PP 1,11 < 0 and π PP 2,22 < 0. Therefore, second order conditions for maximization are satisfied. reaction function has a slope of ∞. Given that the slope of the reaction function of Firm 2 is increasing (and is less than unity), we have a unique best response for Firm 1 given any p 2 implying uniqueness of the equilibrium point. Finally, if for some (p PP 1 (θ), p PP 2 (θ)), V PP 1,12 < 0, then it is obvious that we will have a unique intersection.
Step 2: At θ = 0, the equilibrium price vector (p PP 1 (0), p PP 2 (0)) satisfy following first order conditions
For complements, the first type of welfare loss is present but the second type of welfare loss is absent since price competition is a dominant strategy. and 
0) > c and using the fact that the demands are symmetric with own effect dominant cross effect we have,
Finally,
Here the first equality is by definition, the second equality is due to (6), the first inequality follows from the fact
) and last inequality is due to (8) . This proves Step 2. To complete the proof we also use Figure 3 . Given any θ, its (unique) corresponding equilibrium price vector (p PP 1 (θ), p PP 2 (θ)) is the intersection of the reaction function of Firm 1 p 1 = SV PP 1 (p 2 , θ), and the reaction function of the Firm 2 p 2 = R PP 2 (p 1 ). By condition (5), R PP 2 (c) > c and 0 < dR PP 2 (p 1 )/dp 1 < 1 implying that p 2 = R PP 2 (p 1 ) must intersect the p 1 = p 2 line from above (see Figure 3) 1) , that is, the over braced segment PP in Figure 3 . The PP segment in Figure 3 lies to the left of
Moreover, the PP segment also lies to the right of Figure 3 must lie completely above the 
Proof of Lemma 2: To prove
Solving for
from (9) and (10) we obtain
is positive due to Assumption 3 and Assumption 4. Given Lemma 1, for every θ ∈ (0, 1), q 2 ) and, given any p 1 , Firm 2 chooses q 2 to maximize π q 2 ) is the demand function of Firm i. The first order condition of Firm 1 is
The first order condition of Firm 2 is
Observe that the reaction function of Firm 1 is 
where
dR PP 2 dp 1 > 0 and
Hence, given F QQ 1,1 (q) < 0, we get
Proof of Lemma 3: To prove part (i) and part (iii) of this result we use an application of the Fundamental (Gradient) Theorem of Line Integrals that states the following: Consider any function f : 2 + → which is twice differentiable. For any a = (a 1 , a 2 ) >> (0, 0), a = (a 1 , a 2 ) >> (0, 0) and for any scalar t ∈ [0, 1] such that a(t) = (a 1 (t), a 2 (t)) = (ta 1 + (1 − t)a 1 , ta 2 + (1 − t)a 2 ) >> (0, 0),
Condition (14) specifies that given any smooth path a(t) connecting points a and a in the domain of a function f , the line integral through the gradient of the function f equals the difference in its scalar at the endpoints (that is, f (a ) − f (a)) (see Apostol [2] for a more detailed discussion on line integrals). Proof of (i): In the price space, given any θ ∈ (0, 1), if Firm 2 chooses price strategy, then Firm 1's reaction function is p 1 = SV PP 1 (p 2 , θ), and, if Firm 2 chooses quantity strategy, then Firm 1's reaction function is the set of points P (SV QQ 1 (θ)) and can be written in implicit form as
As a result we have
Condition (16) holds since from the first order condition of profit maximization and welfare maximization we have c = p
2 hence implies (16) . Also observe that
Condition (17) (16) and (17) implies that there exist θ R ,θ S with θ R ≤ θ S such that for any θ ∈ (0, θ R ) and any θ ∈ (θ S , 1) we
and applying condition (14) to this equality with end points
By Assumption 3 and Lemma 2 (ii) it follows that for condition (18) to hold we must have p PP Along Firm 2's reaction function 
In particular, whatever be the shape of the locus of W PP 1 (p) = 0, starting from the point (c, c) as we move along that locus by increasing p 2 , the welfare has to fall (see Figure 4) and, since the transformed reaction function (π QQ 1,1 (q) = 0) of Firm 1 in price space must lie above
. Welfare reaction function in price space
(1)) < 0 since for a profit maximizing firm quantity strategy strictly dominates price strategy. Since
is a continuous function of θ the result follows. Proof of (iii): For this proof we restrict our attention to the quantity space (q 1 , q 2 ). 
Using Assumption 2 (i) it follows that
curve. Thus, we have (20) lim
Also observe that
Condition (21) curve. Condition (20) and (21) implies that there exist θ R , θ S with θ R ≤ θ S such that for all θ ∈ (0, θ R ) and θ ∈ (θ S , 1) we have q (14) to this equality with end points (q
By Assumption 2 and Lemma 2 (i), it follows that for condition (22) to hold with θ R < θ S , we must have q 
By Lemma 2 (ii), (23), we get
, the optimal choice of θ in Stage 1 under price competition is θ = 0.
If θ = 0 is the optimal choice of Stage 1, then, given θ = 0 < θ 1 , it is optimal for Firm 2 to choose price strategy when Firm 1 chooses price strategy (Lemma 3 (i)). Moreover, since θ = 0 < θ 4 , it is optimal for Firm 2 to choose price strategy even when Firm 1 chooses quantity strategy (Lemma 3 (iii)). Therefore, with θ = 0, choosing price is the dominant strategy for Firm 2 in Stage 2. Moreover, since θ = 0 < θ 3 and since choosing price is the dominant strategy for Firm 2, it is optimal for Firm 1 to choose price strategy (Lemma 3 (ii)). Hence, given θ = 0, in Stage 2 it is optimal for both firms to choose price strategy and it is the unique Nash equilibrium of the sub-game of Γ starting from Stage 2.
Proof of Lemma 5:
We prove Lemma 5 using the following figure.
In Figure 5 , the curve R PP Step-2 of the Lemma 1, the point B must lie to the left of point C on R PP 2 . We do not impose any restriction on the locus of P (SV QQ 1 (1)) implying that it can take any shape and can intersect the curve R PP 2 R PP 2 more than ones. But the 7 In this Figure 5 , we draw all curves as straight line just for simplicity of exposition. By Lemma 3 (i), when Firm 1 chooses price strategy, there exist a θ 1 ∈ (0, 1) at which Firm 2 is indifferent between choosing price strategy and quantity strategy, and, for θ < (>)θ 1 ∂θ > 0, any point on the segment AE excepting point E corresponds to θ < θ 1 . Hence, we cannot find any selection θ in Stage 1 for the government that can induce any (p 1 , p 2 ) combination that lie in this segment of AE (except point E). Finally, the government won't induce any point on or to the right of E since each such point (on the R PP 2 R PP 2 ) generates less welfare than at point B. Since the point B can be induced by choosing θ = 0 (by Lemma 4), the result follows.
Proof of Lemma 6: Consider Figure 6 . In Figure 6 we introduce two new curves. The first one is the iso-welfare curve corresponding to welfare level of point B (that is, the welfare level W PP (0)). The second one is the S PP 2 S PP as shown in the Figure 6 by the dotted region (where the boundary is not included for the BC segment). Hence, the set in which the Type II equilibrium can occur is
Since, due to Assumption 4, the S PP 1 S PP 1 curve can never bend back and since the only intersection of the closure of E QP and the Ω PP W is point B and B is not in E QP , the set Ω PP W and the set E QP must be disjoint. Hence, for any price vector associated with Type II equilibrium, the resulting welfare is always less than the welfare corresponding to point B. Therefore, Type II equilibrium is ruled out. Figure 9 where in Figure 7 we consider the quantity space and in Figure 8 we consider the price space. In Figure 7 , the curves R 1 R 1 , RC and R 2 R 2 corresponds respectively to the function q 1 = SV QQ 1 (q 2 , 1), q 1 = SV QQ 1 (q 2 , 0) and q 2 = R QQ 2 (q 1 ). Each curve is negatively sloped and both R 1 R 1 and R 1 C curves have an absolute slope of more than unity and the R 2 R 2 curve has an absolute slope of less than unity. If θ = 1, then firms are symmetric and hence we have q QQ 1 (1) = q QQ 2 (1). Hence, the intersection point of R 1 R 1 and R 2 R 2 must lie on the q 1 = q 2 line (see point A in Figure 7 ). For any point on the R 1 C curve we have p 1 = c and for any point on the R 1 R 1 curve we have p 1 > c excepting at point R 1 where we have q 1 = 0 and hence we also have p 1 = c. Since by Assumption 1 own effect on indirect demand is negative, the R 1 C curve must lie to the right of the R 1 R 1 curve . Consider point B (in Figure 7) which is the point of intersection between the R 1 C and the R 2 R 2 curves. Point B must lie to the right of point A and both A and B are on R 2 R 2 . Point B is the Cournot equilibrium vector (q 
Proof of Lemma 7: Consider
is the parametric representation of the AB segment of R 2 R 2 with A (B) representing the quantity vector corresponding to θ = 1 (θ = 0). As θ varies from 0 to 1 we move from point B to point A along R 2 R 2 as shown by the arrows in Figure 7 . Figure 10) . Since E QP ⊂ E QQ , we must have Lemma 6) and the continuity of the graph of P (R QQ 2 ) in the price plane, there exists exactly one compact set S P (⊂ P (R QQ 2 )) such that (a) the interior of S P is contained in the complement set of E QP ∩ Ω PP W , (b) we can find (p 1 , p 2 ) in the intersection of the boundaries of the sets S P and Ω PP W , and, (c) we can find another (p 1 , p 2 ) in the intersection of the boundaries of the sets S P and E QP . Using Lemma 7 we can now say that each θ for which (p QQ 1 (θ), p QQ 2 (θ)) in the interior of S P is higher compared to every θ such that (p
) and is lower compared to every θ such that (p
Thus, it is impossible for the government to induce Cournot competition by choosing θ such that resulting price vector belongs to Ω PP W ∩ P (R QQ 2 ). For Case 2, the entire E QP does not lie to the right of the vertical line p 1 = p PP 1 (0) (see Figure 11 ). Consider the set 
The following argument shows that the answer is no. By Lemma 7, along the graph of the set S Pa m in the price plane, p 1 is increasing (along the segment B A in Figure 8 ) and it must contain at least two points in the boundary of E QP each of which corresponds to Type I equilibrium price vector for θ = 0. Along the graph S Pa m , the behavior of p QP 1 (θ) is shown in Figure 12 . Suppose (p
m . By Lemma 3 (ii) θ 4 is unique and by Lemma 2, p
k . Let OT denote the length of the OT segment in Figure 12 . Given (p 
Proof of Proposition 1:
We use four steps to prove the result.
Step (i): The value of θ that maximizes W PP (θ) must belongs to (0, 1).
Proof of
Step (i Assumption 7, we also have (dR PP 2 (p 1 )/dp 1 ) < 0. Hence, at θ = 0, (0, 1) . Hence, at θ = θ * the equilibrium price vector (p PP 1 (θ * ), p PP 2 (θ * )) must belong to the interior of the segment AB (say some point like D in Figure 2) where the iso-welfare curve is tangent to the R 2 R 2 curve.
)).
Step (iii): In Stage 2, choosing price is the dominant strategy for Firm 2. Proof of Step (iii): When Firm 1 chooses price strategy, the curve R 2 R 2 is the reaction function of Firm 2. Therefore, the singleton set SV PP 1 ∩ R PP 2 must lie to the left of all points in the set P (SV QQ 1 (θ)) ∩ R PP 2 . Therefore, at any given θ, if Firm 1 chooses price strategy, then it is always optimal for Firm 2 to choose price strategy. When Firm 1 chooses quantity strategy, the set of points P (R . Therefore, at any given θ, if Firm 1 chooses quantity strategy, then also it is optimal for Firm 2 to choose price strategy.
Step (iv): In Stage 2, if Firm 2 chooses price strategy, then Firm 1 also chooses price strategy. Proof of Step (iv): On the region lying above the set T := {p | p 2 ≥ c, p 1 + p 2 ≥ 2c}, V PP 1,2 (p, θ) = θπ PP 1,2 (p) + (1 − θ)W PP 2 (p) < 0. Therefore, V PP 1 (p, θ) is decreasing in p 2 for all points in the set SV PP 1 (θ) ∩ T . Again, the reaction function of Firm 2 given Firm 1 chooses price (that is, the R 2 R 2 curve in Figure 2 ) lies above the line p 2 = c and each point in this reaction function lies below all points in the set P (R QQ 2 ). Moreover, all points on the AB segment in Figure 2 is contained in T and for all points on the AB segment we have dV PP 1 (SV PP 1 (p 2 , θ), p 2 )/dp 2 < 0. Therefore, at the intersection point of the R 2 R 2 curve and the p 1 = SV PP 1 (p 2 , θ) curve, we value of V PP 1 (p, θ) is higher compared to all points in the set SV PP 1 ∩ P (R QQ 2 ). Hence, given Firm 2 chooses price strategy, it is always optimal for Firm 1 to choose price strategy. Hence, Step (iv) follows.
Step (iii) and Step (iv) shows that given any θ ∈ [0, 1], price competition is the only Nash equilibrium of the sub-game starting from Stage 2. By Step (i), at some θ * (∈ (0, 1)), the government maximizes welfare under price competition. Therefore, the strategy combination (θ PP = θ * , (P, p PP 1 (θ PP )), (P, p PP 2 (θ PP ))) is the unique SPNE of Γ.
